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In this text a number of different conceptions of tolerance are
disentangled. A failure to distinguish them has meant a
serious incompleteness in the arguments of those who have
claimed that tolerance is either a liberal or communitarian
virtue. The author proceeds to examine whether or not the
liberal and communitarian proponents violate the imperative
of tolerance, after which he argues that liberals must have a
better defence of tolerance if they wish to retain the concept.
Drawing on insights from French philosopher Jacques
Derrida, a model is developed for a postmodern liberalism
which shares an affinity with Rawls’ conception of political
liberalism.
INTRODUCTION
The word tolerance is related to the Latin and Old English
terms meaning "to lift up" and "to bear" "to put up with" or "to
support". Based on its etymology tolerance can be under-
stood in a negative or positive manner. Within a negative fra-
mework, tolerance is interpreted as a burden and partial ac-
ceptance of the other, whom we "put up with". Within a pos-
itive framework, tolerance can be interpreted as a supporting
and fostering of otherness, plurality and diversity. In what fol-
lows, I want to examine the different types of economies
which have emerged from the different approaches to toler-
ance. I want to argue that certain types of liberalism (repre-
sented by Locke and Mill) and certain types of communitari-
anism (represented by MacIntyre) are restricted and intoler-
ant.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section one, I shall
disentangle a number of different conceptions of tolerance; a907
failure to distinguish them has meant a serious incomplete-
ness in the arguments of those who have claimed that toler-
ance is either a communitarian or a liberal virtue. In Section
two, I examine whether or not liberal and communitarian pro-
ponents violate the imperative of tolerance. In Section three,
I argue that liberals must have a better defense of tolerance if
they wish to retain the concept. Drawing on insights from the
French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, I develop a model for a
"postmodern liberalism", which shares an affinity with Rawls’
conception of "political liberalism".
I
The Etymology Of Tolerance
In a remarkable study, Preston King points out that "there is
something intolerable about the concept of 'tolerance'.1 For
King, the fundamental question concerning tolerance has to
do with "the legitimacy of the advantage which the tolerator
may enjoy"(T. 9). Framed in this manner, tolerance does not
promote equality, but inequality. According to King, "the pro-
ponents of tolerance... normally fall into two classes. On the
one hand, there are the poor, the oppressed, the unfortunate,
who, hard-pressed as these always are, beg for indulgence.
On the other hand, there are the wealthy, the powerful, the
fortunate, who, the better to protect their advantage, make
marginal concession to those over against whom it is held"(T.
9-10). For King, toleration is linked to the question of power.
According to King, "toleration of an item presupposes some
form of power over that item"(T. 14). Mere tolerance is sub-
versive because it protects the interests of the powerful who
are content with their advantage over others.2 The means of
tolerance is determined by those who hold power and decide
what will be included in and excluded from their economies.
This type of tolerance allows only those practices to flourish
which do not threaten the internal purity of the system.
In his study, King examines the differences between
three English nouns, namely, tolerance, toleration and tolerationism.
King points out that the discussion concerning tolerance has
ignored these grammatical distinctions. Rather than focusing
on the distinctions between tolerance, toleration, and tolerationism,
I want to emphasize the distinctions within the word tolerance.
To this end, I will examine five definitions of tolerance.3
The first definition of tolerance, is the action or practice
of enduring pain or hardship. Here, tolerance is defined as
putting up with that which we dislike. This definition presup-
poses that once we overcome the pain and hardship which is
inflicted from the outside, things will be better.
The second definition of tolerance is the power acquired








or resisting the action of poison. This definition points out
that the agent being tolerated can be harmful but not fatal;
that a certain degree of immunity can be built up over a peri-
od of increased and controlled exposure to the "harmful" agent.
The third definition of tolerance is the small margin wi-
thin which coins when minted are allowed to deviate from
the standard. Here, the question of the model or form is brought
into question. Only a small degree of deviation from the mo-
del is tolerated. Once the deviation exceeds acceptable limits,
intolerance becomes "the norm".
The fourth definition of tolerance concerns the allowable
amount of variation in the dimensions of a machine or part.
In this instance, variation is allowed as long as it resembles
the original.
The fifth definition of tolerance is allowing practices to
take place without authoritative interference. This definition pre-
supposes that an authority has already granted that diversity
can exist, provided that these practices are acceptable to the
authority.
All of the above definitions determine tolerance as a "ne-
gative virtue". Tolerance becomes the practices of "putting up
with" what is not actually approved. As King points out: "In
the tolerating conjuncture we discover elements both of ob-
jection (dislike/disapproval) and of acceptance... when we tol-
erate x, we accept it in the sense either that we associate with
it or do not interfere with it in some limited sphere, in some
limited degree. "(T. 52). According to King, there is a "tension
internal to tolerance"(T. 35). This tension occurs in that space
where objection intertwines with acceptance. King points out
that "the objection is... a matter of degree"(T. 51). A total and
comprehensive objection would signal the end of tolerance.
Tolerance understood as "putting up with" sketches a re-
stricted picture of what it means to be human while outlining
the kind of existence that is essentially good or virtuous for the
human individual. Tolerance, in the restricted and negative
sense of "putting up with", presupposes a moral high-ground
for the person who is in a position to tolerate the other.
In each definition of tolerance, there is a source, standard
or model, in relation to which something is judged to be tol-
erable or intolerable. Thus, the problem of tolerance is opened
by putting into question the value of the arche4 (source, origin
or center). The arche provides stability and unity at the ex-pense
of arresting the profileration of differences, such that a restrict-
ed economy5 ensures the arche is used to orientate, balance
and organize its accounts, while limiting plurality. A restrict-
ed economy must prevent the profileration of differences in







As we have seen, the word tolerance is caught up in a chain
of significations. In "An Early Essay on Toleration", Harriet Tay-
lor, argues that toleration "implies the existence of its oppo-
sites"6 Taylor points out that " while we can be conscious that
we tolerate there must remain some vestige of intolerance ...
not to be charitable is to be uncharitable" (EET. 116). I want to
argue, that it is inadequate to conceive of tolerance as arising
out of a series of oppositions; that it cannot simply be
assigned a site which is understood in terms of those opposi-
tions. In order to rethink the economy of tolerance in a liber-
al society, we must prevent ourselves from trying to compre-
hend tolerance on the basis of opposition. As King argues,
one cannot praise an individual, sub-group or govern-
ment simply because they are tolerant. They may be toler-
ant of cruelty and genocide. Nor can one condemn agents
simply because they are intolerant. They may be intoler-
ant of cruelty and genocide. In this sense, therefore, every-
thing must turn, not around tolerance and intolerance,
but around the objects of tolerance and intolerance, and
the consideration whether they are properly objects of the
one rather than of the other (T. 68).
Herbert Marcuse argues that tolerance is of two kinds,
namely passive and active. Passive tolerance, according to Mar-
cuse is in fact partial to "entrenched and established attitudes
and ideas even if their damaging effect on man and nature is
evident".7 Tolerance, on the other hand is active in that "it re-
frains from taking sides"(RT. 85). This type of tolerance may
still be a form of prejudice because through its neutrality, it
"actually protects the already established machinery of dis-
crimination"(RT. 85) (e. g. "tolerance" of minorities by means of
segregation or assimilation). Marcuse correctly points out that
"when tolerance mainly serves the protection and preserva-
tion of a repressive society... then tolerance has been pervert-
ed"(RT. 111). Instances of this distorted tolerance occur both in
the liberal and communitarian traditions, (e. g. ignoring the spe-
cific needs of minorities). According to Marcuse,
the tolerance which is the life element, the token of a free
society, will never be the gift of the powers that be; it can,
under the prevailing conditions of tyranny by the majori-
ty, only be won in the sustained effort of radical minori-
ties, willing to break this tyranny and to work for the emer-
gence of a free and sovereign majority-minorities intoler-
ant, militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of be-
havior which tolerate destruction and suppression (RT. 123).
The question of tolerance becomes relative once we exa-
mine, who is tolerating what.Normally, neutrality has been
thought to be the foundation upon which tolerance could ex-
ist. Taylor links tolerance with neutrality, by arguing that "to to-








will surely one day not need a place in any catalogue of virtues"
(EET. 116-117).
In The Restoration of Tolerance, Steven D. Smith raises the
issue of neutrality and tolerance and argues that the choice
which faces a liberal society is not between intolerance and neu-
trality, but between tolerance and intolerance. Smith argues
that "the prevailing conception of liberalism, which is com-
mitted to the ideals of neutrality and equality, is incapable of
supporting a viable liberal community"8. I share Smith's views
that a state which is committed primarily to neutrality can be
repressive, stagnant or even impotent insofar as it wants to
neutralize change itself. According to Smith,
a healthy political community must stand for something.
If it does not, then it becomes a mere aggregation of jar-
ring individual atoms; politics and government becomes a
battleground... A community's values, especially in a plu-
ralistic society, may not constitute a unitary or cohesive
philosophy. But a state which asserts that in principle it is
simply neutral among competing values, like an individ-
ual who denies that he believes in or is committed to any-
thing, is not likely to command one's respect. . Thus, the
liberalism of neutrality in fact impoverishes the very com-
munity that it promises to enrich (RT. 328, 329).
Smith argues that neutrality is not an alternative to intol-
erance, and I agree that neutrality can be co-extensive with in-
tolerance. However, I disagree with Smith when he argues that
the true alternative to intolerance is tolerance. As we shall
see, tolerance defined as "putting up with" is in fact intolerant
because it suppresses differences. The choice, as I see it, is
between two types of tolerance, namely, tolerance as "putting
up with" and tolerance as "supporting or fostering otherness".
II
Restricted Liberalism, Communitarianism
And The Question Of Tolerance
John Rawls describes toleration as "liberalism's own princi-
ple"9 and Will Kymlicka characterizes tolerance as "one of the
fundamental liberal values"10. On the other hand, Glenn Tin-
der, argues that "where there is full community, no tolerance
is necessary".11 Both the liberal and communitarian traditions
operate according to a certain level of tolerance and charity.
Liberals claim to be tolerant in theory, but based on individ-
ual and egalitarian principles, liberal societies have, in prac-
tice often suppressed differences, i. e. have been intolerant.
Communitarians on the other hand, think that a homoge-
neous community does away for the need of tolerance, which,
of course, can come dangerously close to tyranny, dictator-
ship or fascism. In this section, I want to mark out the limita-







communitarianism as represented by MacIntyre. By examin-
ing liberal and communitarian positions we will be able to
determine whether or not liberal and communitarian propo-
nents violate the imperative of tolerance and charity. In this
manner, the dangers of a certain kind of liberalism represent-
ed by Locke and Mill and a certain kind of communitarian-
ism, represented by MacIntyre, will become apparent.
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke argues that,
"those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God.
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human
society, can have no hold upon an atheist.12 According to
Locke, the "liberty of conscience is every man's natural right
equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves and that
nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by
law or force" (LT. 47). Locke goes on to argue, "it is not the
diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the re-
fusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which
might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles
and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon account
of religion" (LT. 52). The gist of Locke's argument is clear. While
variation in belief is not immoral and should be tolerated,
those who hold no theistic beliefs (i. e. atheists), should not be
tolerated because they are immoral. Ironically, Locke failed to
recognize that intolerance was only an issue for those who
believed in a deity and not for those who rejected theism.
John Stuart Mill also develops a puzzling attitude towards
tolerance. In the opening section of On Liberty, Mill argues
that some people may be more fit for despotism than liberty.
Mill argues that "... Despotism is a legitimate mode of govern-
ment in dealing with barbarians, provided the end may be
their improvement... ".13 In this instance, tolerance towards
the barbarian does not apply. The other is already described
as a "barbarian" who must be improved by becoming "a good
European" perhaps. While restricted liberals like Locke and
Mill argue for tolerance, their interpretation of "tolerance"
rests on intolerance and a denial of otherness. As we shall see,
communitarians like MacIntyre do not seem to provide an
alternative position. It is clear that, within the restricted liber-
al and communitarian paradigms, those who are tolerated are
only those individuals who belong to a specific group. Those
outside the group, who hold radically different beliefs(i. e.
deviate too far from the standard), are not to be tolerated.
A certain form of tolerance exists within the communi-
tarian tradition14. I agree with Steven D. Smith, who points
out that "tolerance is a virtue in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense in-
sofar as it is a prerequisite to the kind of cooperation that marks








the liberal individual " is a citizen of nowhere, an internal ex-
ile where he lives... Modern liberal political society can appear
only as a collection of citizens of nowhere who have banded
together for their common protection".15 According to Mac-
Intyre the liberal individual is isolated and egoistic,
To cut oneself off from shared activity in which one has
initially to learn obediently as an apprentice learns, to iso-
late oneself from the communities which find their point
and purposes in such activities, will be to debar oneself from
finding any good outside of oneself... our pluralistic cul-
ture possess no method of weighing, no rational criterion
for deciding between claims based on legitimate entitle-
ment and against claims based on need (AV. 240,229).
In order to combat liberal isolation, MacIntyre tells us,
that what we need, " is the construction of local forms of com-
munity within which civility and the intellectual and moral
life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are al-
ready upon us"(AV. 245). The type of community envisioned by
MacIntyre, is a community in which the other is avoided and
in which the stranger is excluded or exploited. Such exclusion
is not only characteristic of communitarianism but shares an
affinity with restricted versions of liberalism.
Liberals may argue that the communitarian principles of
unity and coherence play an unnecessarily exclusionary, re-
pressive role. Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves argues that,
community is a term associated with strong identities, fixed
by custom and tradition and rooted in history and/or col-
lective memory. Tolerance, on the other hand, suggests
more flexible identities, less rooted in history and collec-
tive memory and more open to the acceptance of differ-
ence, of plurality and of alternative lifestyles... . in the mo-
dern age it would seem, therefore, that those who uphold
the principle of tolerance have little in common with those
who uphold the principle of community. How is it possi-
ble to defend tolerance if one is a bearer of an identity
rooted in history and fixed by tradition, afraid of being
assimilated or displaced by other identities?16
The question of tolerance cannot be reduced to a simple
either/or equation. d'Entreves seems to be saying that com-
munity is hostile to the principle of tolerance because it takes
difference as something that exists only outside the (homoge-
neous) community17. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of
individualism, would, according to d'Entreves, provide a space
for tolerance. Both classical liberals such as Locke and Mill
and communitarians like MacIntyre, want at all costs to main-
tain the boundary line between the inside and the outside. I
want to argue that the questions of tolerance will never be
answered if it is simply reduced to a choice between either com-







stood merely as "putting up with" the other, rather than "sup-
porting" and fostering the alterity of the other.
In the next section, I will attempt to make a case for a
new tolerance which escapes the confines advocated by com-
munitarians such as MacIntyre and liberals such as Locke and
Mill. Drawing on the insights of Jacques Derrida, I argue that
liberals must have a better defense of tolerance if they are to
retain the concept.
III
The New Tolerance And Charity Of Postmodern Liberalism
It is important to note that the synonym of tolerance is chari-
ty. Charity engages the question of the relationship to the other.
Within the context of our discussion, charity refers to the indi-
vidual’s approach to that which confronts him. How does
one welcome a friend or stranger? The attitude which the in-
dividual adopts in addressing friends, strangers or enemies
who wish to seek admission into our economy reflects our in-
terpretation of the call to embrace a positive tolerance and to
be charitable towards the other. The concept of charity, its cog-
nates and their genealogies, comport a plethora of antitheti-
cal senses. Charity is a cognate of the Latin caritas, suggesting
dearness, costliness, high price(the cost of a gift), and carus dear,
valued, esteemed, beloved. The concept of charity is also affil-
iated with the Sanskrit word kama, the old Irish world caraim
(love) and the Slavic word kamata which means both debt and
the interest payment calculated on a loan. Construed in the
light of its etymology, charity, resonates with significations of
not only giving gifts but also of being indebted to the other.
I want to suggest that tolerance should be rethought on
the basis of charity. The charity which is being described here
is a complex charity that cuts across differences. Rethinking
tolerance on the basis of charity will allow us to leave behind
the negative definition of tolerance as "putting up with" and
adopt the positive definition of tolerance as supporting or
fostering diversity.
As we have seen, liberals such as Locke and Mill and
communitarians such as MacIntyre, call for a denial of other-
ness, that is, a denial of alternative perspectives which fail to
cohere within their own conceptual schemes. Within the res-
tricted liberal and communitarian schemes, the existence of
alternative practices, world views, or ways of life are incom-
prehensible and hence candidates for intolerance. Restricted
liberals and communitarians fail to cultivate the power of the
question. Their unnecessarily restrictive paradigms of unity,
close off the possibility of questioning. Subscribers to both re-








demand for a unified horizon and are mandated to develop
an interpretive posture which fits with, rather than breaks from,
the story told by their traditions. Both operate according to an
exclusionary policy. Alternative positions which depart too
far from the story that the tradition tells, positions which sim-
ply fail to cohere with the dominant paradigm or model, are
swiftly excluded from consideration.
Postmodern liberalism should seek an alternative approach
which will overcome the unnecessary, reductive properties of
both restricted liberalism and communitarianism. I am aware
of how startling the phrase "postmodern liberalism" might
seem here. Postmodernism and deconstruction are usually as-
sociated with a destruction of ethical values. Richard Rorty ar-
gues that while deconstruction is important on a private level
it is "pretty much useless when it comes to politics" and is
"largely irrelevant to public life and political questions"18. In a
recent interview Ronald Dworkin expresses the view that
postmodernism "is silly, indeed incoherent".19
I interpret postmodernism as an event which revises the
restricted understanding of ethics and the relation of self and
other. The task of postmodern liberalism calls the citizen forth
with a radical responsibility and tolerance which is based on
charity. Postmodern liberalism will permit hitherto excluded
positions to be heard. It will offer an alternative to unequivo-
cal hegemony of one unified metanarrative over other narra-
tive.
A postmodern liberalism will interrogate those forces
that have made dominance and intolerance a central part of
their agenda. Postmodern liberalism will reveal that within
the codes and rules of restricted moralities, there has always
been an intolerance. A postmodern liberalism will cultivate plu-
rality and alterity, rather than suppress it.
The postmodern liberalism which I am developing here,
shares an affinity with Rawls’ conception of political liberal-
ism and justice as fairness, which is not metaphysical.20 Rawls
argues that,
the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is
practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is,
it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true,
but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing
political agreement between citizens viewed as free and
equal persons... in a society marked by deep divisions be-
tween opposing and incommensurable conceptions of the
good, justice as fairness enables us at least to conceive how
social unity can be both possible and stable.21
Rawls concedes that although political liberalism is "neu-
tral in aim"22 it may "affirm the superiority of certain forms of







The virtues which Rawls enumerates are "the virtues of fair
social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance,
of reasonableness and the sense of fairness" (PL. 194).
In Force of Law, Derrida describes that deconstruction, "ope-
rates on the basis of an infinite idea of justice". 23 This decon-
structive justice is "owed to the Other before any contract.
"(FL. 965) Deconstructive justice is committed to responsibili-
ty and to Otherness. Derrida argues deconstructive justice
"always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the
Other" (FL. 955). Deconstructive justice examines the phe-
nomena of injustice that has oppressed, marginalized and
excluded the Other. A deconstructive justice exposes the vio-
lence inherent in all restricted economies. Within a restricted
economy, the metaphysical blanket protected dominant for-
ces, while systematically smothering and eliminating Other-
ness. A restricted economy operates according to a metaphy-
sical (i. e. comprehensive) and totalitarian metanarrative, that
formulates laws in order to suppress Otherness. In short, a
restricted economy employs a resistance to Otherness, whose
final aim is the total elimination of Otherness.
A restricted economy, has always been threatened by the
forces that have upset its order. The response to these "threats",
has been to contain them in one place, i. e. the clinic, the
prison, the "safe haven" or the concentration camp. A restrict-
ed economy maintains purity by excluding difference. Such
exclusion is based on intolerance.
A restrictive tolerance which merely "puts up with the
other" maintains its oppressive dominance. The tolerance of
postmodern liberalism, on the contrary, should be linked to
charity and should adopt an openness to Otherness. Other-
ness is cultivated, rather than suppressed. A postmodern lib-
eralism would provide a sobering account of the intolerance
of certain restrictive communities to intrusions.
Restricted liberal and communitarian strategies for con-
taining undecidability, shelter individuals from options that
might otherwise appear. Postmodern liberals recognize that
decisions must be made in the face of a set of equally com-
pelling alternatives.
Plurality increases both the difficulty and liberty involved
in decision making. Postmodern liberalism allows for a series
of rival divergent choices. In giving individuals more options
and no independent basis for ultimately selecting from these
options, postmodern liberalism calls for an increase in res-
ponsibility. In Derrida's words, " each case is other, each deci-
sion is different and required an absolute unique interpreta-









According to Derrida, "undecideability is always a deter-
minate oscillation between possibilities... These possibilities are
themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations
(for example... political, ethical, etc. ) They are pragmatically
determined". 24 The task of the postmodern liberal is to invig-
orate these highly determined contexts in order to open up
more possibilities than would otherwise be generated by the
restricted liberal or communitarian program.
A postmodern liberalism will support the imperative of
stating and maintaining the liberty of the question. Maintain-
ing the liberty of the question allows individuals to choose be-
tween various forms of life without protest or interference.
The deference to the demands of coherence excludes other world
views and reduces the liberty of the question. Tolerance as
political, incorporates a responsibility both to the other and to
the liberty of the question. Maintaining the liberty of the
question, to borrow Kymlicka's words, "is the first step in
starting a dialogue".25
A dialogue involves an interplay between self and other.
How we respond reflects the tolerance we show toward the
Other. Our response towards any question can take the form
of "yes"or "no". As Derrida points out, " One always has, one al-
ways must have, the right not to respond, and this liberty
belongs to responsibility itself, that is, to the liberty that one
believes must be associated with it. One must always be free
not to respond to an appeal or to an invitation- and it is worth
remembering this, to remind oneself of the essence of this lib-
erty"(PO. 15, my emphasis). This responsive "no" recognizes a
limit to what is "tolerated". David H. Jones, argues that,"citi-
zens with liberal civic virtues must recognize limits to toler-
ance and that their loyalty to liberal institutions will some-
times require them to repudiate and even combat some of the
more robust forms of illiberal community".26
IV
The Toll: Concluding Remarks
A postmodern liberalism will be attentive to the question of
what kind of community will emerge from the new tolerance.
Will it be "a community that builds on the resources of differ-
ence and diversity that begin to emerge with pluralism" or a
community which "sets out to annihilate the communities that
do exist". (ML. 179) In examining the question of tolerance,
Susan Mendus asks," what are the requirements of tolera-
tion... does toleration require more than merely letting alone?
Does it require assisting and nurturing?" (TLL,17). We are
now in a position to answer, that tolerance does require more
than "merely letting alone". The tolerance which is being out-







understood in terms of charity is a supporting of the other.
But this support is not without criticism. The citizen who dwells
in the polis is one who responds, questions and criticizes res-
ponsibly.
Let us recall that tolerance relates to the question of the
toll. A toll is a fixed charge to travel across a bridge or road.
This question engages the discussion of customs, debts and
borders; of admission and who is allowed to enter; of what is
allowed to cross over of what is acceptable; of what and who
is allowed to pass over to the other side.
Ultimately, the meaning of tolerance is found in the rela-
tion that I have with the Other. and the demand that is placed
upon me by the other. Tolerance is a "problem of human rela-
tions" (T. 21). Tolerance is a question of how we meet the Other.
Do we meet the Other with the charity of the open hand or
the imperialism of the closed fist and of the equally closed
mind?
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U ovome radu razmatra se nekoliko razli~itih koncepcija
tolerancije. Odsutnost njihova razlikovanja ozbiljan je
nedostatak u argumentima onih koji su tvrdili da je
tolerancija liberalna, odnosno komunitarna vrijednost.
Nadalje, u tekstu se ispituje kr{e li pristalice liberalizma,







zatim utvrdilo da liberali moraju bolje braniti toleranciju
ukoliko `ele zadr`ati taj koncept. Polaze}i od misli
francuskog filozofa Jacquesa Derride autor razvija model za
postmoderni liberalizam koji je sli~an Rawsovoj koncepciji
politi~kog liberalizma.
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In dieser Arbeit werden verschiedene Konzeptionen der
Toleranz untersucht. Die fehlende Unterscheidung dieser
Konzeptionen erwies sich als ernster Mangel in der
Argumentation jener, die behaupteten, daß die Toleranz ein
liberaler bzw. kommunitärer Wert sei. Der Verfasser
untersucht ferner die Frage, ob die Befürworter des
Liberalismus bzw. des Kommunitarismus gegen den
Imperativ der Toleranz verstoßen, und stellt fest, daß die
Liberalen entschlossener für die Verteidigung der Toleranz
eintreten müssen, wenn sie dieses Konzept bewahren wollen.
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